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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  2010  Green  Paper  on  Audit  Policy  by the  European  Commission  has  explicitly  questioned  the
sufﬁciency  of audit  rotation  rules established  by European  Union  Members  to guarantee  auditor  inde-
pendence.  In addition,  the  Paper  clearly  states  that  more  research  is  needed  regarding  the  effects  of long
audit  tenures  on independence.  In this  article,  we have  replicated  the  research  by  Ruiz-Barbadillo,  Gómez-
Aguilar,  and  Biedma  (2005)  about  the  effects  of  audit  ﬁrm  tenure  on  independence  with  more  updated
data.  However,  unlike  them,  we  have  performed  panel  data  estimations  instead  of  pooled  regression.
Our  approach  allows  for  a better  control  of  individual  unobserved  heterogeneity,  thus  reducing  potential
problems  caused  by  omitted  variable  bias. While  Ruiz-Barbadillo  et al. reported  an  unexpected  positive
effect  of  tenure  on the  likelihood  of audit  qualiﬁcations,  we do  not  show  any  signiﬁcant  effect  of  tenure
on  the opinion  of  the audit  report.  Our  results  are  robust  to various  sensitivity  analyses.
© 2012 ASEPUC.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All rights  reserved.
Efecto  de  la  duración  del  contrato  de  auditoría  en  la  recepción  de  informes
cualiﬁcados:  nueva  evidencia  para  el  mercado  espan˜ol
alabras clave:
otación del auditor
ndependencia
alvedades
r  e  s  u  m  e  n
El  Libro  Verde  sobre  Política  de  Auditoría  elaborado  por la  Comisión  Europea  en  2010 ha  puesto  en  duda
la suﬁciencia  del marco  regulatorio  actual  de  la  auditoría  vigente  en  la Unión  Europea  para  garantizar
adecuadamente  la  independencia  del  auditor.  Además,  el  documento  reconoce  explícitamente  la  necesi-
dad de  más  investigación  sobre  los  efectos  en  la  independencia  del auditor  de  relaciones  de  auditoría  que
se perpetúan  en el  tiempo.  En  este  artículo,  hemos  replicado,  con datos  más  actuales,  la  investigación  de
Ruiz-Barbadillo  et  al. Sin  embargo,  a diferencia  de  ellos,  hemos  utilizado  un  enfoque  de  datos  de  panel  en
lugar  de una  regresión  agrupada.  Nuestra  aproximación  permite  controlar  mejor  los  problemas  derivados
de la  heterogeneidad  no  observada,  reduciendo  los  problemas  de sesgo  debido  a la  omisión  de  variables.
Ruiz-Barbadillo  et al. obtuvieron  el  resultado  inesperado  que  a  mayor  número  de  an˜os  auditados  por  un
mismo  auditor  más  probable  era  que  el  informe  de  auditoría  presentara  salvedades.  Nuestros  resultados,
por el contrario,  no  muestran  ningún  efecto  signiﬁcativo  de  la  duración  de  la  relación  con  el  auditor  en
la opinión  del  informe  de  auditoría.  Los  resultados  obtenidos  son robustos  a los  análisis  de  sensibilidad
12 A
que  se han  realizado.
©  20
ntroductionThe growing importance of corporate governance matters for
esearchers and policy makers, particularly after the dot-com
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bubble and more recently the contemporaneous ﬁnancial crisis,
has motivated a large body of research on the quality of ﬁnancial
statements. The proliferation of corporate scandals as Enron,
WorldCom, Parmalat and Lehman Brothers have posed serious
concerns about the reliability of ﬁnancial statements, since in none
of these cases they showed the real situation of the ﬁrm.
The external auditor is the key ﬁgure to guarantee the quality
of ﬁnancial statements, and thus its role is crucial in the corporate
governance scheme. When these statements have an unqualiﬁed
opinion, participants in the ﬁnancial markets assume they show
the current situation of the ﬁrm. Nevertheless, the external auditor
hts reserved.
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aces a conﬂict of interests regarding the relationship with the
udited company that may  undermine its credibility when judging
ts clients’ ﬁnancial statements. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX),
assed largely as a reaction to corporate ﬁnancial scandals of the
ot-com era, attempted to improve the quality of ﬁnancial state-
ents of public companies in the U.S. Among other issues, the SOX
ncluded some provisions to strengthen auditor independence.
ith the same aim, corporate governance codes approved in
umerous countries worldwide have included recommendations
o guarantee auditor independence.
The length of auditor-client relationships constitutes a major
ssue in the auditor conﬂict of interest, because long relation-
hips may  cause auditor complacency about management decisions
egarding the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements. Following this view,
he mandatory rotation of external auditors has long been sug-
ested to improve independence. With this aim, the SOX required
 study about the potential effects of imposing mandatory rota-
ion. Although the results of the study did not support that auditor
otation increased the quality of ﬁnancial reports, and therefore,
t did not recommend mandatory rotation (Myers, Myers, & Omer,
003), regulators ﬁnally established that lead audit partners and
oncurring partners could not perform audit services for the same
lient for more than ﬁve consecutive ﬁscal years. In addition, they
lso required a minimum ﬁve-year time-out period before a part-
er might return to audit a client. Similarly to the situation in the
.S., mandatory rotation of the audit partner is nowadays required
n many countries.
The Green Paper on Audit Policy, (EC, 2010) by the European
ommission, explicitly questions the sufﬁciency of the actual reg-
latory framework to guarantee auditor independence. The Paper
lso encourages additional research about the effects of long audit
enures on independence. In this line, the main motivation of this
rticle is to provide new and updated evidence about the effects of
udit tenure on independence. Besides, available research for low
itigation risk countries following our approach is not only scarce
Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-Aguilar, & Biedma, 2005; Vanstraelen,
000) but also provides conﬂicting results. It should also be noted
hat both articles analyze the audit sector before the fall of Arthur-
ndersen and the enforcement of the SOX. During the last decade,
ot only the audit sector has been subjected to important regula-
ory changes, but also, litigation risk seems to have increased even
n low litigation risk countries. Therefore, as posed among others
uthors by Fargher and Jiang (2008) and Feldmann and Read (2010),
esults reported by previous research need to be updated.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly
nd most importantly, the methodology we propose is robust com-
ared with both Vanstraelen (2000) and Ruiz-Barbadillo et al.
2005) (hereafter RBGB). Despite the panel structure of their data,
either Vanstraelen (2000) nor RBGB used a panel data approach
o undertake the analyses. Both papers performed a pooled logis-
ic regression, although they did not mention any test on a likely
utocorrelation pattern in their data. The main advantage of panel
ata estimation over pooled regression is that it allows control-
ing for individual unobserved heterogeneity. Since unobserved
eterogeneity is the main problem in non-experimental research,
his advantage becomes particularly useful. In the speciﬁc case of
he investigation of audit qualiﬁcations, given the generally low
xplanatory power of the proposed models, there is a serious poten-
ial for an omitted variable bias, due to unobserved heterogeneity.
n addition, unlike both Vanstraelen (2000) and RBGB, signiﬁcance
ests have been performed with robust standard errors. This issue
ecomes important because, due to the panel structure of the data,
he error term will not be independent and identically distributed.
onsequently, results reported by Vanstraelen (2000) and RBGB
ight suffer from methodological pitfalls. Secondly, we  report new
vidence about the effects of tenure on audit qualiﬁcations which – Spanish Accounting Review 16 (2) (2013) 118–125 119
do not support available evidence for the Spanish market. Unlike
RBGB, reporting an unexpected strength of independence asso-
ciated to longer tenures, we  do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of
tenure on independence. Finally, unlike both Vanstraelen (2000)
and RBGB, which did not check the robustness of the reported
results, our results are robust to various sensitivity analyses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion “Audit regulation in Spain”, we  outline the regulation of the
auditor–client relationship in Spain. In section “Review of the liter-
ature” we  review previous research. In section “Research design”,
we develop our model and explain the dataset. In section “Results”
are discussed and section “Sensitivity analyses” are presented in
section six. Finally, in section “Conclusion”, we summarize the main
conclusions.
Audit regulation in Spain
The market for audit services in Spain started with the imple-
mentation of the 8th Directive on Company Law. With the main goal
of increasing the reliability of the company’s ﬁnancial statements
the Spanish Audit Law was  enforced in 1988. The Law established
the obligation for companies above a certain size to appoint an
external auditor to issue a report about the company’s ﬁnancial
statements. A change in the legislation in 1997 increased the mini-
mum  size for a company to be obliged to audit ﬁnancial statements,
and reduced approximately by a 20% the number of companies sub-
ject to audit (Garcıa-Benau, Ruiz-Barbadillo, Humphrey, & Husaini,
1999).
To safeguard auditor independence, the Spanish Audit Law
established a set of criteria to regulate the auditor–client relation-
ship. Accordingly, a multi-year contract was established with a
length ranging between three and nine years. In addition, inde-
pendently of the length of the initial contract, the re-election of the
audit ﬁrm was  not allowed. The imposition of a limit in the number
of years a company could be audited by the same ﬁrm was equiv-
alent to establish a mandatory auditor rotation rule. Nevertheless,
both, the limit on the maximum number of years to be audited
by the same ﬁrm, and the prohibition to renew the audit contract
were abolished after a legal reform in 1995. Afterwards, auditors
would be contracted for an initial period ranging between three and
nine years, but after the expiration of the initial contract the com-
pany could renew the contract with the auditor on a yearly basis.
A consensus exists that Spanish legislation has not been particularly
strict in specifying safeguards to strengthen auditor independence
(Gonzalo, 1995; Paz-Ares, 1996; Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-Aguilar,
De Fuentes-Barberá, & García-Benau, 2004). Although, from a legal
point of view a company could break its audit contract only if a
‘just cause’ exists, given that the Law did not clarify what this just
cause could be, a company could hire and ﬁre its auditor without
any time limitation (Gomez Aguilar & Ruiz-Barbadillo, 2000).
Similarly to the SOX in the U.S., the Spanish Financial Law was
enforced in 2002 as a reaction to corporate ﬁnancial scandals. Dur-
ing the process of approving the Law, an amendment was included
containing the mandatory rotation of the audit ﬁrm every twelve
years. According to this amendment, the external auditor would
be hired for an initial period of three years and could be renewed
for periods of three years, with a maximum of twelve years. After
the expiration of this term, the change of the audit ﬁrm would be
mandatory, and a minimum three-year period was required to re-
hire the audit ﬁrm. This amendment elicited strong criticism from
the auditing profession (Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-Aguilar, & Carrera,
2006), which ﬁnally led to its withdrawal. At the end of the process,
mandatory rotation was  limited to change the audit team but not
the audit ﬁrm.
Following the revised 8th Directive, the 27 member states of the
European Union were required to adapt their national law systems.
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ne important feature of this Directive was to establish audit part-
er rotation, although each State Member could voluntarily ﬁx the
aximum length of the auditor-client relationship. Therefore, in
010 a new Spanish Audit Law was enforced establishing, among
ther issues, the mandatory rotation of the leading audit part-
er after seven years. In addition, a minimum two-year period is
equired for the re-auditing of the same ﬁrm. This reform, however,
ill not affect our results, since our research period ends in 2009.
eview of the literature
The effects of tenure on auditor independence have been mostly
ddressed through the issuance of going-concern audit qualiﬁ-
ations to ﬁnancially stressed ﬁrms. Only Levinthal and Fichman
1988) for the U.S. and Vanstraelen (2000) and RBGB for Belgium
nd Spain, respectively, have included in the analysis all types
f ﬁrms and audit qualiﬁcations. Although most evidence does
ot support a loss of independence with tenure, some evidence
o the contrary also exists. While most authors agree that audit
ualiﬁcations are less likely during the earlier years of engage-
ent, they provide contradictory results about the relationship
etween tenure and audit qualiﬁcations after the initial period.
ouwers (1998) and Carcello and Neal (2000), with samples of U.S.
ompanies, did not support a loss of independence with tenure.
anstraelen (2002) and Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) reached a
imilar conclusion regarding the Belgian audit market. Both articles
eported that the auditor’s going-concern opinion did not appear
o be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by tenure. Knechel and Vanstraelen
2007) also observed that type I errors, deﬁned as issuing a going-
oncern opinion to a company which did not ﬁle bankruptcy in
he following year, appeared to be lower when tenure was longer.
owever, recent research available for the U.S. has provided con-
radictory results. While Lim and Tan (2010) reported a positive
ffect of tenure on the propensity to issue going-concern opin-
ons to ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, Gul, Basioudis, and Ng (2011)
ocumented a negative effect.
The analyses carried out by Levinthal and Fichman (1988)
or the U.S. and Vanstraelen (2000) for Belgium represented two
xceptions in the literature, since they did not limit to ﬁnancially
tressed companies or to going-concern opinions. Both articles
oncluded that long-term auditor–client relationships signiﬁcantly
ncreased the likelihood of unqualiﬁed audit reports. In addition,
oth papers agreed that auditors were more willing to issue unqual-
ﬁed reports in the ﬁrst two years of engagement (the so-called
honeymoon period’ in the auditor–client relationship). Conversely,
BGB reported a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of tenure
n audit qualiﬁcations in Spain. The authors found this result sur-
rising given the institutional characteristics of the Spanish audit
arket, most importantly the low risk of litigation. However, they
onsidered that it could indicate that auditors were less willing
o issue qualiﬁed reports during the initial period of engagement
ecause they were more economically dependent of the client.
esides, this result did not support some other research in the Span-
sh market, which has analyzed the issuance of going-concern audit
ualiﬁcations to ﬁnancially distressed companies. Ruiz-Barbadillo
t al. (2004) did not observe a signiﬁcant effect of tenure on
he likelihood of audit qualiﬁcations. Similarly, Ruiz-Barbadillo
t al. (2006), following a panel data approach, concluded that long
enures did not affect audit qualiﬁcations, and, as Vanstraelen
2000), that short tenures made audit qualiﬁcations less likely.
inally, although the main interest in Jara and López (2007) research
as not the implications of tenure on auditor independence, they
id not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of tenure on the likelihood of quali-
ed reports. The loss of independence associated to tenure reported
y Vanstraelen (2000) in Belgium is explained by the low litigation – Spanish Accounting Review 16 (2) (2013) 118–125
risk proﬁle of the Belgian audit market. However, the strength of
independence in longer tenures reported by RBGB is difﬁcult to
explain in terms of, either the litigation risk of the Spanish market,
or results reported by related research for the Spanish market.
Research design
Model
Tenure has potentially contradictory effects on audit quality as
shown by DeAngelo’s (1981) classical deﬁnition of audit quality
as the joint probability an auditor will both detect (competence)
and report (independence) material misstatements. The opposite
effects of tenure on competence and independence could cause
contradictory effects on the likelihood of audit qualiﬁcations. How-
ever, following previous research we  have measured independence
through the auditors’ propensity to issue a qualiﬁed report.
Accordingly, the research question states:
Does the likelihood of qualiﬁed audit reports decrease with
tenure?
The issuance of qualiﬁed opinions will be inﬂuenced by the audi-
tor’s perceived consequences in the economic trade-off between
the expected cost of the potential loss of a client, on the one hand,
and the probability of being exposed to third-party lawsuits and
loss of reputation, on the other. Available evidence indicates that
the probability of switching the audit ﬁrm increases after a qual-
iﬁed report (e.g., Chow & Rice, 1982 and Krishnan, 1994 for the
U.S.; Craswell, 1988 for Australia). Besides, Krishnan and Krishnan
(1996) and more recently Fargher and Jiang (2008) have supported
litigation risk as a major determinant of the auditor’s opinion in
the U.S. Therefore, in high litigation risk countries, where repu-
tation is of most importance for the audit ﬁrm, auditors could
be less willing to impair independence compared with the situ-
ation in low litigation risk countries. Although litigation risk might
have increased in the Spanish market during the last decade, as
suggested by the stronger supervisory role of the ICAC (Instituto
de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas) and by the increase in the
number of sanctions to auditors, Spain is still considered as a low
litigation risk country. Accordingly, the following hypothesis has
been stated:
Hypothesis. The likelihood of qualiﬁed reports should be lower
in lengthy auditor–client relationships.
For the purposes of this research, audit reports with adverse
opinion or disclaimer of opinion are considered qualiﬁed reports.
We have used a logistic model to address the effects of tenure
on the likelihood of audit qualiﬁcations. The dependent binary vari-
able is the auditor’s opinion, coded 1 in case of a qualiﬁed opinion,
adverse opinion or disclaimer of opinion, and coded 0 in case of
an unqualiﬁed opinion. Our experimental variable is the number
of consecutive years a company has been audited by the same ﬁrm.
Similarly to RBGB, control variables include: the existence of losses;
the level of inventories; an indicator of the solvency of the ﬁrm; the
level of accruals; the size of the audited ﬁrm; and the type of audit
ﬁrm. Unlike RBGB, given the panel structure of our dataset, we have
performed a panel data logistic estimation.
Accordingly, we  propose the following model:
OPINION = f (PER, EXTA, FRAC, CCTA, TA, NM,  TEN)
where:
OPINION is a binary variable indicating whether the audit report
is unqualiﬁed or qualiﬁed.
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Table 1
Classiﬁcation of audit reports by year and auditor opinion.
Year Unqualiﬁed reports Qualiﬁed reports Total
2001 56 (77%) 17 (23%) 73
2002 65 (82%) 14 (18%) 79
2003 69 (84%) 13 (16%) 82
2004 69 (84%) 13 (16%) 82
2005 71 (87%) 11 (13%) 82
2006 73 (90%) 8 (10%) 81
2007 71 (89%) 9 (11%) 80J. García Blandón, J.M. Argilés Bosch / Revista de Conta
PER is a binary variable with value of 1 if the company’s net proﬁt
on year t is negative and 0 otherwise. EXTA is computed as the
ﬁrm’s inventories divided by total assets at the end of the year.
FRAC is an indicator of the probability of bankruptcy, as mea-
sured by Zmijewski (1984), with weights determined according
to Carcello, Hermanson, and Huss (1995).
CCTA is computed as the ratio of working capital to total assets, as
an indicator of the level of accruals.
TA is the natural log of the ﬁrm’s total assets at the end of the year,
as a proxy for size.
NM is a binary variable with value of 1 if the company is audited
by a non-Big 4 audit ﬁrm and 0 otherwise.
TEN indicates the length of the auditor-client relationship. It has
been measured as the number of consecutive years the company
has been audited by the same ﬁrm (TENURE). Alternatively, we
have included two dichotomous variables: TENURE < 3 is deﬁned
as one for those observations with less than three years of tenure
and zero otherwise; similarly, TENURE > 9 is one for those obser-
vations in which tenure is 10 years or more, and zero otherwise.
The discussion of the expected effects of control variables on
he probability of qualiﬁed reports is based on RBGB. Companies
xperiencing losses will face a higher probability of receiving a
ualiﬁed report. Thus, a positive coefﬁcient is expected for PER.
he explanation would be that ﬁrms having losses will be more
ikely to involve themselves in earnings management activities
e.g., Defond and Jiambalvo, 1993; Firth, 2002), thus making audit
ualiﬁcations more likely. The auditing of inventories may  repre-
ent serious difﬁculties because it involves two audit assertions:
aluation and completeness (McDaniel, 1990). Consequently, as
osed by Simunic (1980), audit fees were higher for those ﬁrms
ith relatively large amounts of inventories. In addition, audit
rrors (Firth, 2002) and lawsuits against auditors (St. Pierre and
nderson, 1984) are frequently caused by inventories. Therefore,
e expect a positive coefﬁcient associated to EXTA. FRAC meas-
res the probability of bankruptcy based on Zmijewski (1984),
here higher values indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy.
imilarly to the predicted effect for PER, previous research (e.g.,
luger & Shields, 1991) supports that ﬁnancially stressed compa-
ies will be more likely to participate in earnings management
ctivities, thus making qualiﬁed opinions more likely. Accordingly,
e expect a positive coefﬁcient associated to FRAC. Regarding vari-
ble CCTA, although RBGB explicitly recognized the limitations of
orking capital divided by total assets as a measure of earnings
anagement, they included this variable as a proxy of discretionary
ccruals. Following RBGB we expect a positive coefﬁcient associ-
ted to CCTA. Following previous research (e.g., Krishnan, 1994;
ennox, 2000), the likelihood of audit qualiﬁcations is higher for
mall than for big companies. Such effect is usually explained in
erms of the higher costs for the audit ﬁrm of losing large clients.
hus we expect a negative coefﬁcient associated to TA. Finally,
revious research has shown that the opinion of the audit report
epends on the characteristics of the incumbent auditor. Accord-
ngly, Big 4 auditors show an incentive to provide higher quality
udits consistent with their brand name reputation (Khurana &
aman, 2004), and thus are expected to show a higher propen-
ity to issue qualiﬁed reports (e.g., Dopuch & Simunic, 1982; Carey
 Simnett, 2006). Therefore, we expect a positive coefﬁcient for
ariable NM.
ample and datasetOur sample is formed by the companies quoted in the Span-
sh Stock Exchange (SIBE market) during the research period:
001–2009. Data regarding independent variables in the model
as been provided by Thomson Reuters Knowledge, while2008 65 (81%) 15 (19%) 80
2009 66 (85%) 12 (15%) 78
information about the nature of audit reports has been obtained
from the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). Finan-
cial information has been taken from consolidated accounts. The
year 1990 is the ﬁrst year available for our experimental variable
TEN. Since control variables in our model include liquidity and debt
ratios, similarly to previous research, banks and ﬁnancial compa-
nies have been removed from the sample. After removing all com-
panies which have not been listed throughout the entire research
period, we have arrived at a total of 83 companies and, given the
nine-year period, 747 ﬁrm-year observations. Nevertheless, in 30
cases information about at least one variable included in the anal-
ysis was  not available. Consequently, our dataset has been ﬁnally
formed by 717 ﬁrm-year observations. In this research, we have
examined 717 audit reports, 605 of them unqualiﬁed, and 112 with
a qualiﬁed opinion. Therefore, qualiﬁed audit reports represent 16%
of total reports examined, similar to the 15% reported by RBGB.
In 2002, after the Enron scandal, the Spanish branch of Arthur
Andersen merged with Deloitte. For the purposes of this research,
we have considered that all companies audited by Arthur Andersen
in 2001 and then by Deloitte in 2002 have not changed the audit
ﬁrm. In our view, this merge will not affect our results, because
in practically all cases the audit partner did not change in 2002.
Therefore, the potential threats for independence persist.
In Table 1, we show the 717 reports classiﬁed by year and type
of auditor opinion. As seen by the table, the percentage of qualiﬁed
reports has ranged between a maximum of 23% in year 2001 and
a minimum of 10% in year 2006. In RBGB these percentages are 19
and 12, respectively.
Results
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics about the independent
variables used in the multivariate logistic regression. Focusing on
TENURE, the average audit tenure in our sample is almost 10 years,
with a maximum of 20 years. Further, while only 13% of cases show
ﬁrm-audit relationships of two years or less (TENURE < 3), in 49% of
cases it is 10 years or more (TENURE > 9). RBGB reported an average
tenure of seven years with a maximum of 11 years. These ﬁgures
are comparable because both papers, RBGB and our work, use 1990
as the ﬁrst year available for tenure. Therefore, we could conclude
that audit tenures experienced a considerable increase in the past
decade. Our sample shows a strong concentration of the audit mar-
ket by Big4 auditors, representing 92% of the total reports, in line
with the ﬁgures reported by CNMV (2009) (95 and 96% in 2008 and
2009, respectively). This value is considerably higher compared to
the 60% reported by RBGB.
Table 3 shows Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcients, together with
signiﬁcance levels, for the independent variables used in the multi-
variate logistic regression. Interestingly, the positive and signiﬁcant
correlation between TENURE and TA shows that big companies tend
to have lengthy audit relationships. Similarly, companies audited
by Big4 auditors also have longer tenures compared with compa-
nies audited by nonBig4 ﬁrms. These results are supported when
122 J. García Blandón, J.M. Argilés Bosch / Revista de Contabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 16 (2) (2013) 118–125
Table  2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Max  Min
OPINION 0.15 0.00 0.35 1.00 0.00
PER  0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00
EXTA  0.15 0.11 0.15 0.97 0.00
FRAC  −2.92 −1.60 32.80 77.56 −938.07
CCTA  0.45 0.44 0.21 0.99 0.01
TA  6.68 6.46 2.00 11.77 0.01
NM  0.08 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.00
TENURE 9.54 9.00 5.76 20.00 1.00
TENURE < 3 0.13 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.00
TENURE > 9 0.49 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00
Variable deﬁnitions:
OPINION is a binary variable indicating whether the audit report is unqualiﬁed (score 0) or qualiﬁed, adverse or disclaimer (score 1).
PER  is a binary variable with score 1 if the company’s net proﬁt on year t is negative and 0 otherwise.
EXTA is computed as the ﬁrm’s inventories divided by total assets at the end of the year.
FRAC is an indicator of the probability of bankruptcy, as measured by Zmijewski (1984).
CCTA is computed as the ratio of working capital to total assets, as an indicator of level of accruals.
TA is the natural log of the ﬁrm’s total assets at the end of the year, as a proxy for size.
NM  is a binary variable with score 1 if the company is audited by a non-Big 4 audit ﬁrm and 0 otherwise.
TENURE is the number of consecutive years the company has been audited by the same ﬁrm.
TENURE < 3 is a binary variable with score 1 if tenure is two years or less and 0 otherwise.
TENURE > 9 is a binary variable with score 1 if tenure is ten years or more and 0 otherwise.
Table 3
Pearson correlations and levels of signiﬁcance between independent variables.
PER EXTA FRAC CCTA TA NM TENURE TENURE < 3
PER
EXTA 0.11***
FRAC 0.04 −0.11***
CCTA 0.02 0.58*** −0.11***
TA −0.20*** −0.42*** 0.23*** −0.48***
NM 0.16*** −0.22*** 0.01 0.12*** −0.24***
TENURE −0.17*** −0.10*** 0.02 0.05 0.22*** −0.27***
TENURE < 3 0.009* 0.02 −0.03 −0.08** −0.08** 0.15*** −0.55***
TENURE > 9 −0.19*** −0.11** 0.01 0.02 0.19*** −0.28*** 0.87** −0.38***
*
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variables and Pearson’s chi-square test for the dichotomous vari-
ables PER, NM,  TENURE < 3 and TENURE > 9 are shown in Table 5.
Regarding our experimental variable TENURE, ﬁrms with unqual-
iﬁed reports show signiﬁcantly longer tenures compared with
Table 5
Median values of independent variables for ﬁrms with qualiﬁed and with unqualiﬁed
reports. For qualitative variables PER, NM,  TENURE < 3 and TENURE > 9 mean values
are  provided.Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
enure is measured through the two dichotomous variables. As
xpected, we observe that nonBig4 auditors tend to audit relatively
mall companies, and that large ﬁrms are more able to avoid losses
han small ﬁrms. Since correlation coefﬁcients between indepen-
ent variables are rather low (the maximum correlation coefﬁcient,
n absolute terms, between variables simultaneously included in
he estimation is 0.58), multicollinearity will hardly affect our esti-
ation results. Nevertheless, we have calculated variance inﬂation
actors (VIF), shown in Table 4, in order to rule out the negative
otential effects of multicollinearity in our estimation results. As
xpected, VIF show very low values (the maximum value is 1.80
or variable CCTA with an average of 1.43), thus supporting our
revious view that multicollinearity will not affect our results.
Before the estimation of the multivariate logistic regression, we
ave performed a univariate analysis of differences of means for
ubsamples of ﬁrms with qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed audit reports. As
xpected, the Shapiro–Wilk test shown in Table 5 reveals that the
able 4
ariance inﬂation factors (VIF).
VIF
PER 1.23
EXTA 1.65
FRAC 1.25
CCTA 1.80
TA 1.69
NM 1.17
TENURE 1.21hypothesis of normality is rejected for all independent variables,
thus we  have performed the Mann–Whitney test of differences
of medians in order to assess the statistical signiﬁcance of these
differences. Median values of independent variables for each sub-
sample, jointly with results of Mann–Whitney test for continuousShapiro–Wilk test Qualiﬁed Unqualiﬁed Signiﬁcance test×
PER 0.39 0.11 58.25***
EXTA 11.11*** 0.13 0.11 −1.40
FRAC 15.34*** −1.20 −1.70 −4.85***
CCTA 4.25*** 0.45 0.40 1.05
TA 5.83*** 5.45 6.42 5.62***
NM 0.11 0.08 1.13
TENURE 7.04*** 7.01 10.02 5.22***
TENURE < 3 0.23 0.11 10.52***
TENURE > 9 0.28 0.53 23.96***
Signiﬁcance tests:
Mann–Whitney test of differences of medians for variables: EXTA, FRAC, CCTA, TA,
TENURE.
Pearson’s chi-square test for the dichotomous variables: PER, NM, TENURE < 3,
TENURE > 9.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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Table  6
Results from random effects panel logistic regressions on the probability of issuing qualiﬁed opinions. Parameters estimates with z-values in parentheses.
Variable Expected Sign Panel a. Model with TENURE Panel b. Model with TENURE < 3 AND TENURE > 9
PER + 1.74 (3.35)*** 1.74 (3.32)***
EXTA + 5.79 (2.57)*** 5.96 (2.60)***
FRAC + 0.68 (2.91)*** 0.69 (2.94)***
CCTA + −3.30 (−2.01)** −3.32 (−2.00)**
TA − −0.56 (−2.99)*** −0.58 (−3.07)***
NM − −2.06 (−2.32)** −2.00 (−2.24)**
TENURE − −0.04 (−0.89)
TENURE < 3 ? 0.31 (0.65)
TENURE > 9 − −0.01 (−0.03)
Constant 2.38 (1.34) 2.08 (1.16)
N  717 717
Pseudo R2 20.06 20.08
Chi  Square 40.90*** 40.36***
% Correctly Clas. 87 87
*** ***
ﬁ
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** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
rms with qualiﬁed reports (P-value < 0.01). This result suggests
 loss of independence with tenure, and is contrary to RBGB who
eported that ﬁrms with unqualiﬁed reports had relatively shorter
enures. The same result is provided when audit tenure is mea-
ured through the two dichotomous variables TENURE < 3 and
ENURE > 9. In both cases differences are statistically signiﬁcant (P-
alue < 0.01). We  also observe signiﬁcant differences between the
wo groups of ﬁrms in the predicted direction for variables: PER,
RAC and TA. Therefore, losses and lower levels of solvency are pos-
tively associated with a higher frequency of audit qualiﬁcations.
onversely, size is negatively associated with audit qualiﬁcations.
inally, no signiﬁcant differences between the two  groups of ﬁrms
re observed for variables: EXTA, CCTA and NM.
After the univariate analysis, we have carried out the investiga-
ion of the joint effect of the proposed variables on the likelihood
f qualiﬁed reports, with a panel data estimation of the multivari-
te logistic model. Since most of our companies show unqualiﬁed
eports for each of the years included in our research period, the
se of a ﬁxed effects logistic model would imply the loss of most a
ajority of our dataset. Thus, we have used a random effects logis-
ic model. Signiﬁcance tests have been implemented with robust
tandard errors. Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of the
odel with TENURE (panel A) and with TENURE < 3 and TENURE > 9
panel B). Regarding panel A, the overall model is signiﬁcant [P-
alue < 0.000], with an adjusted pseudo R2 of 20%, slightly above the
8% reported by RBGB. The model correctly classiﬁes 87% of cases
72% in RBGB]. It is important to note that the likelihood ratio test
upports the use of a panel data estimation [Chi-Square = 101.21;
-value < 0.000], rather than the pooled logistic approach. Our vari-
ble of interest, TENURE, shows a negative coefﬁcient, indicating
hat audit qualiﬁcations are less likely as tenure increases. How-
ver, the effect is not statistically signiﬁcant at the required levels.
esults from the univariate analysis suggested a loss of indepen-
ence in long audit tenures. Nevertheless, the univariate analysis
oes not consider potential research confounds. Conversely, the
ultivariate approach controls for potential differences across the
ample that may  confound simple univariate comparisons (Becker,
efond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). Therefore, according
o the results provided by the estimation of the logistic model, we
onclude that the length of the auditor–client relationship does
ot signiﬁcantly affect the opinion of the audit report. Results
o not support the hypothesis developed in the fourth section
f this research. Similarly to RBGB we conclude that long audit
enures do not seem to compromise independence. However,
nlike these authors we do not observe stronger levels of inde-
endence associated to longer tenures. Since both, the research
eriod and the sample of ﬁrms are different in this paper and in98.78
RBGB, results are not directly comparable. Additionally, the esti-
mation method is different between our paper and RBGB. While
RBGB used pooled regression we have performed panel data esti-
mation. The lack of signiﬁcance of tenure on the likelihood of audit
qualiﬁcations supports Ruiz-Barbadillo et al. (2006) investigation
of the issuance of going-concern qualiﬁed opinions to ﬁnancially
distressed ﬁrms. Our main result contradicts available evidence
reported by Vanstraelen (2000) for the Belgian market, showing
that audit qualiﬁcations were less likely in lengthy audit engage-
ments. However, in Vanstraelen’s research, since control variables
failed to account for the company’s ﬁnancial health, this result
could be due to a variable omission problem. It should be noted
that subsequent research for the Belgian audit market, limited to
going-concern audit qualiﬁcations (Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007)
and including ﬁnancial ratios among the regressors, has concluded
that tenure did not have a signiﬁcant effect on audit qualiﬁcations.
Focusing on control variables, in all cases they show signiﬁcant
effects on the probability of audit qualiﬁcations. Besides, with the
only exception of CCTA, signiﬁcance is observed in the predicted
direction. Evidence supporting the results of the univariate anal-
ysis is observed for: PER, FRAC and TA. We  also report signiﬁcant
effects for variables EXTA, CCTA and NM,  although the univariate
analysis did not provide signiﬁcant differences for these variables
depending on the nature of the audit report. Results for control
variables support, for the most part, previous evidence reported by
RBGB. Firms with solvency problems (FRAC) and those experienc-
ing losses (PER) show higher probabilities of audit qualiﬁcations.
As expected, non-Big4 auditors are less willing to issue qualiﬁed
reports. The level of stocks (EXTA) positively affects the likelihood
of audit qualiﬁcations. Similarly to RBGB but contrary to our ini-
tial predictions, CCTA shows a negative effect on the probability
of qualiﬁed reports. In our opinion, this result could be due to the
shortcomings of CCTA as a proxy of discretionary accruals, as explic-
itly recognized by RBGB. Besides, since working capital is also an
indicator of liquidity, it seems rather reasonable that more liquid
ﬁrms (those ﬁrms with higher values of CCTA) show a lower prob-
ability of audit qualiﬁcations. Regarding the effects of size, RBGB
reported an unexpected positive sign for the coefﬁcient associated
with the variable TA, although only marginally signiﬁcant. In our
estimation, the effect of size on the likelihood of audit qualiﬁcations
is negative, as expected, and highly signiﬁcant (P-value < 0.01), indi-
cating that the probability of audit qualiﬁcations decreases with
size.Table 6 (panel B) shows the estimates of the model with the
dichotomous variables TENURE < 3 and TENURE > 9. Results are
very similar to those reported for the model with TENURE. Coefﬁ-
cients associated to TENURE < 3 and TENURE > 9 are not statistically
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Table  7
Sensitivity analyses. Panel A: Measurement of TENURE. Panel B: Effects of year 2002. Panel C: Auditor’s switches.
Variable Expected Sign Panel A Panel B PANEL C
PER + 1.75 (3.22)*** 1.60 (2.71)*** 1.95 (3.45)***
EXTA + 6.19 (2.58)*** 5.46 (2.26)** 6.23 (2.52)**
FRAC + 0.62 (2.65)*** 0.78 (3.07)*** 0.82 (3.18)***
CCTA + −3.83 (−2.16)** −3.88 (−2.21)** −4.06 (−2.25)**
TA − −1.24 (−2.79)*** −1.43 (−3.08)*** −1.52 (−3.15)***
NM − −1.73 (−1.89)* −1.77 (−1.86)* −2.19 (−2.29)**
TENURE − −0.03 (−0.76) −0.03 (−0.71) −0.02 (−0.38)
Constant 2.18 (1.19) 3.12 (1.63) 3.14 (1.60)
N  629 638 669
Pseudo  R2 18.33 20.08 18.90
Chi  square 36.98*** 35.44*** 40.26
%  Correctly Clas. 86 87 88
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eSigniﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
igniﬁcant at the usual levels. Therefore, our main conclusion that
udit tenure does not impair independence is robust to various
easures of tenure. Besides, since the coefﬁcient associated to
ENURE < 3 is not signiﬁcant, we conclude that a ‘honeymoon
eriod’, as deﬁned by Levinthal and Fichman (1988), does not seem
o exist in the Spanish audit market. Results regarding control
ariables also remain unchanged.
ensitivity analyses
We  have performed various sensitivity analyses in order to
heck the robustness of our results. All sensitivity analyses have
een limited to the model with TENURE. First and most importantly,
e want to rule out the potentially negative effects of measurement
rrors in our variable TENURE. As in RBGB, the ﬁrst year available
or this variable in this research was 1990. Since the ﬁrst year of
ur research period is 2001, for those companies which did not
hange the auditor during the whole period 1990–2001, the value
f TENURE in year 2001 was 12 years. However, we  do not know
he actual value of TENURE, since it could be 12 years or more. Such
ircumstance affects 21 companies in our sample representing 88
rm-year observations. Therefore, we have re-estimated our model
fter removing these observations. As it can be seen from Table 7
panel A), results remain largely unchanged, compared with those
eported by Table 6 (panel A). The second sensitivity analysis has
een performed to control for the peculiarities of the year 2002.
he year 2002 was an abnormal year for the audit market, not only
ecause the fall of Arthur Andersen but also due to the enactment of
he Financial Act. Therefore, we have re-estimated our model with-
ut including any observations from the year 2002. Table 7 (panel
) shows that results do not change compared with those reported
or the whole research period. Finally, similar to Carey and Simnett
2006) research on the effects of tenure concerning the likelihood
f a going-concern qualiﬁed opinion in the Australian market, we
ave included a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our
esults to companies switching audit ﬁrms. As shown by Chow
nd Rice (1982), auditors’ switching could be indicative of low
ccounting quality. Thus, for those companies switching auditors
ur proposed model might not adequately capture the likelihood of
udit qualiﬁcations. Accordingly, we have re-estimated the model
fter removing all observations with one year of tenure. As in the
revious analyses, results shown by Table 7 (panel C) remain largely
nchanged.onclusions
Research concerning auditor independence has been strongly
ncouraged by the European Commission’s publication of theGreen Paper on Audit Policy, (EC, 2010). The document questions
that the actual regulatory framework established by the revised
8th Directive on Company Law, could sufﬁce to guarantee auditor
independence. The main goal of this research has been to provide
new evidence regarding the effects of tenure on auditor indepen-
dence, without restricting the analysis to audit qualiﬁcations for
reasons of going-concern and to ﬁnancially stressed ﬁrms. Previ-
ous research in low litigation risk environments by Vanstraelen
(2000) and RBGB have provided contradictory results. Contrary to
Vanstraelen (2000) who  reported a negative and statistically sig-
niﬁcant effect of tenure on the likelihood of qualiﬁed opinions, and
RBGB who  concluded in the opposite way, our results indicate that
tenure does not affect the opinion of the audit report. It should also
be noted that both papers analyzed the tenure-audit qualiﬁcation
relationship before the fall of Arthur Andersen and the enactment
of the SOX. The important changes suffered by the audit profession
during the last decade have made it necessary to update previous
research. Therefore, regarding the concerns expressed by the Green
Paper, our results show that long audit tenure relationships do not
seem to impair independence in the Spanish market. As a proof of
soundness, results regarding control variables show signiﬁcance in
the predicted direction in all cases. It should also be noted that our
results are robust to various measures of audit tenure, to poten-
tial measurement errors in our experimental variable tenure and
to situations of auditors’ switching.
Results reported in this research involve some rather straight-
forward implications for policy-makers. Auditor rotation rules are
supposed to provide some beneﬁts in terms of auditor indepen-
dence, while they will also involve an increase in learning costs for
the audit sector associated to new clients. Our results show that
establishing a mandatory rotation rule for the audit ﬁrm would not
contribute to enhance independence, while it would undoubtedly
increase costs for the audit sector.
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